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Abstract
This paper examines how interventions during early childhood affect disciplining
methods in Colombia, where poor households are eligible for a number of social pro-
grams targeted to young children, based on a proxy means index. These programs
include child care options, nutritional programs and health checks. I analyze whether
these programs affect parents’ disciplining methods through two different identification
strategies. I implement a regression discontinuity design exploiting the discontinuity
on the probability of benefiting from these programs, as a function of the proxy means
index used for targeting. I also implement a propensity score matching using differences
in length of exposure to one of these programs, a subsidized child care program. Re-
sults from the first identification strategy show that fathers of children who benefit from
these programs to a larger extent, use less physical ways to discipline their children.
On the other hand, mothers of children who have been exposed longer to the subsidized
child care option, appear to move to more pedagogic ways of discipline. These results
hold in particular for households with working or more educated mothers.
Keywords: Early Childhood Development, Childcare, Parenting, Domestic Violence
JEL classification: D1, J13, J18, O15
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Introduction
Families are usually thought to be places where children are protected and their rights are
guaranteed. Sadly, within a family, children can also be maltreated or abused; physically,
sexually or psychologically. Young children tend to be more vulnerable to violence at home
and are more likely to be victimized by primary care givers and other family members. This
may happen in part because they are still very dependent and have limited social interactions
outside home [Pinhero, 2006]. Evidence suggests that physical violence1 against children is
common throughout the world, and violence at home is the most common form of violence
against children [Hoeﬄer and Fearon, 2014],[Pinhero, 2006]. On average, 4 out of 5 children,
2 to 14 years old, are subjected to some kind of violent discipline in their homes. Percentages
range from 45% in Panama, to 95% in Yemen [Unicef, 2014].
Experiencing or witnessing violence as a child can have important effects latter in life
[Unicef, 2014]. Children who are victims of violence are at a higher risk of dropping out of
high school and college than their non-abused peers [Duncan, 2000]. Adolescents, maltreated
early in life, are more likely to be absent from school and have higher levels of aggression,
anxiety/depression, dissociation, post traumatic stress disorder symptoms, social problems,
thought problems, and social withdrawal [Lansford et al., 2002]. Being abused or neglected
as a child increases one’s risk for delinquency, adult criminal behavior, and violent criminal
behavior [Widom, 1989]. Also maltreated children are more likely to become maltreating
parents [Kaufman and Zigler, 1987], [Lansford et al., 2007]. Children with absent fathers,
and especially absent fathers and working mothers, have higher rates of child maltreatment,
[Paxson and Waldfogell, 1999]. Single-headed household are at a higher risk of providing
inadequate childcare conditions, a risk that is also related to how the child is being pun-
ished [Berger, 2004]. Young mothers, those who report more parental stress, or report their
child has a more difficult temperament are more likely to spank, [MacKenzie et al., 2011],
[Bartlett and Easterbrooks, 2012]. Community environment also seems to matter, neighbor-
hoods with a higher percentage of 3- and 4-year-old attending preschool or nursery school,
both locally and in adjacent neighborhoods, show lower rates of early maltreatment [Klein,
2011].
Interventions during early childhood have begun to gain importance in the social policy
agenda in developing countries. This kind of interventions have been mostly designed to
address health, nutritional and cognitive deficiencies. Accordingly, early childhood develop-
ment studies have been mostly focused on these outcomes. Less evidence exists on disciplining
practices and spousal violence, factors that also affect children’s development. Parents and
care givers usually use violent and non-violent disciplinary practices, cases where only non-
violent disciplining is used are very exceptional. Violent practices can be either physical,
such as hitting, kicking, pinching or burning; or psychological, such as insulting, belittling,
isolating or rejecting. Caregivers may also rely more on physical ways of discipline to control
children at young ages because they cannot think of alternative non-violent methods [Unicef,
1Physical punishment is defined as “any punishment in which physical force is used and intended to cause
some degree of pain or discomfort, however light”[Pinhero, 2006]
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2014]. According to figures from the Demographic and Health Survey of 2005, [Profamilia,
2005], in Colombia the three most common ways parents use to discipline children are verbal
reprimand, hitting with objects and slaps. Among fathers, these figures are 75%, 41% and
22%, and among mothers 77%, 47% and 34%. Despite these figures, parenting quality and
particularly, discipline practices, is a topic that has not been thoroughly analyzed in the
research agenda in developing countries.
This paper sets out to start filling this gap, by exploiting the quasi-experimental varia-
tion in the design of different social programs in Colombia. A large set of social programs in
Colombia are targeted using a proxy means index, called Sisben. The proxy means index is
a function of a set of household demographic characteristics, consumption of durable goods,
capital endowments and current income [Castaño et al., 1999], it ranks from 0-100 and 6
levels are defined. Population in levels 1 and 2 are eligible for a large set of early child-
hood interventions, which include child care options, nutritional programs and a health care
plan including health checks (growth and development (G&D) checks). This paper aims at
understanding how such social programs affect parents’ disciplining methods2. To my knowl-
edge, this is a research question that has not been addressed yet, and whose answer can help
designing more effective policies. I use two different identification strategies to answer this
question. I implement a Regression Discontinuity analysis using as a forcing variable the
proxy means index, and comparing population before and after the Sisben level 2 threshold.
I also implement a Propensity Score Matching using differences in length of exposure to a
subsidized child care program, Hogares Comunitarios de Bienestar (HCB). For this, I com-
pare children exposed 16 months or more, to children exposed only 2-15 months.
The results suggest that attendance to G&D checks or to a HCB are having an impact on
child rearing practices. G&D checks cover 3 components, an educational content for parents,
development and growth. The educational content for parents covers topics such as nutri-
tion, early stimulation, parenting, and prevention and management of frequent illness; and
discipline begins to be addressed when the child is 13 months old. Parents are told about
the importance of not using physical punishment and are taught alternative strategies to
discipline children. Children who attend a HCB have to follow a routine during the time
they are in the Hogar, and their parents are invited to attend bi-monthly talks on topics such
as parenting, domestic violence and nutrition, among others.
For the Regression Discontinuity (RD) analysis, I use the Demographic and Health Survey
for 2005 in Colombia (DHS05), and use the Sisben Index as the forcing variable. The results
I obtain show that children in households above the Sisben 2 threshold are indeed less likely
to attend G&D checks, particularly they are 26 percentage points less likely to attend at least
3 G&D checks over the last year3. Analyzing the impact on child discipline, results show
2The two data sets I use, provide information on physical and pedagogic ways of discipline, but not on
ways referring to insulting or belittling. Anecdotal evidence suggests that among poor parents, it is common
to insult or belittle children when they misbehave. Unfortunately, I cannot test for changes in this particular
method.
3Table A.2 shows the optimal number of G&D checks children must attend according to their age. On
average, children up to 4 y.o should attend 3 checks during a year.
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that fathers of children who attend regularly G&D checks, use less physical ways of discipline
(0.37 standard deviations less). This result is particularly true for households with mothers
that work outside the household. In this type of households, fathers and mothers of children
who attend less frequently to the G&D checks, use physical discipline in nearly 1 standard
deviation more. While these local treatment effects (LATE) are large, they probably should
be interpreted as the combined impact of different social programs whose eligibility is deter-
mined by the Sisben4.
In the second part of the paper, I concentrate on one specific program and use an alterna-
tive identification strategy, together with a different data set, to obtain a second independent
impact measure. I use a Propensity Score Matching strategy (PSM) to evaluate the impact of
attendance to a subsidized child care program, Hogares Comunitarios de Bienestar (HCB)5,
on maternal discipline practices. I eliminate a first set of concerns about selection into the
program by comparing children who have been exposed to the program 16 months or more, to
those that have been exposed only 2-15 months, following [Bernal and Fernandez, 2013]. For
this strategy, I use the data collected for the evaluation of the program in 2007. Data covers
children 0-6 y.o., and provides information on how the mother punishes the child. Results
show that, overall, mothers of children who have been exposed longer to the program, use
more neglecting and pedagogic ways of discipline. By analyzing differences by mother’s labor
force participation, results show that working women use less physical ways of discipline (0.07
standard deviations), and more pedagogic ways (0.1 standard deviations), the longer their
children have been attending the HCB. For non-working mothers, an increase in the use of
neglecting ways of discipline is observed (0.14 standard deviations).
To interpret these findings, I suggest that the interaction with parents seems to be key for
changing their behavior; either through a change in social norms [Elster, 1999], or through
learning better parenting practices. Attending a HCB or G&D checks on a regular basis can
make parents “feel bad” about the possibility that doctors, nurses or Madres Comunitarias
(Mother from the community) find out the child has been physically punished. Hence, they
stop using physical punishment. In the particular case of HCB, mothers whose children have
been attending longer the HCB are more likely to attend the meetings organized by theMadre
Comunitaria. Also, children longer exposed to the program are less likely to behave bad at
interacting with other children. This last set of results suggest that a longer attendance to
the HCB may generate a change in discipline methods both, through a change in mothers’
and a change in children’s behavior.
After having established the impact on disciplining, I also analyze the impact on spousal
violence. Evidence has shown that in families where one form of violence is present, there
is an increase risk of experiencing the other one [Herrenkohl et al., 2008]. Children who are
exposed to this “Doubly Whammy” effect fare worse than those exposed to only one risk
factor, [Herrenkohl et al., 2008], [Hughes et al., 1989]. It is hence, a priori, possible that a
4Among these programs, we have child care programs, nutritional programs, and educational programs.
5This program is also targeted to population in Sisben levels 1 and 2, however I don’t find a discontinuity
using the DHS05 data. This can be explained by the fact other eligibility criteria is taken into account. I’ll
go further on this on Section 2.4.
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reduction in spousal violence is part of the mechanism underlying the results on disciplining6.
In none of the identification strategies I find a robust impact on spousal violence.
This paper aims to contribute to the literature on early childhood development, which
has focused on short and long term benefits of preschool interventions, but that has not
studied deeply disciplining outcomes, particularly in developing countries. Studies of well
known programs in the United States such as the Perry Preschool Program, the Carolina
Abecederian and Head Start have shown that children who participate in these programs are
less likely to drop out from high school and more likely to have higher test scores. Some of
these programs have addressed parenting behavior by incorporating discussions with parents,
showing a positive effect on nurturance and, sometimes, a decrease in spanking together with
an increase in reasoning as a form of discipline, [Schady, 2006].
Evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean has shown large differences in cogni-
tive development by socio-economic status, [Schady et al., 2014], [Rubio-Codina et al., 2013],
having important implications for long term outcomes. Children with insufficient levels of
nutrition and cognitive and socio-emotional development, tend to do badly in school, to have
a higher incidence of teenage pregnancy, and to be more likely to use drugs or to be in-
volved in criminal activities. The relationship between socio-economic status and cognitive
development can be partially explained by child health and measures of parenting quality,
[Paxon and Schady, 2007]. Particularly, children whose parents have better HOME7 scores,
reflecting warmer and less punitive behavior, have significantly higher TVIP test scores.
In general, programs in Latin America have impacted positively children’s well-being.
Children who receive a cash transfer are more likely to attend school and less likely to
drop out, as well as have better nutritional and development outcomes, [Behrman et al.,
2004b], [Attanasio et al., 2005a,b], [Macours et al., 2012], [Fiszben and Schady, 2009] and
[Paxon and Schady, 2010]. Child care programs, Hogares Comunitarios in Colombia and
PIDI8 in Bolivia, have a positive impact on cognitive development and socio-emotional abil-
ities, but depending on the length of exposure to the program. In Colombia the impact is
found for those who attend at least 15 months, while in Bolivia for those who attend at
least 7 months, [Bernal and Fernandez, 2013], [Behrman et al., 2004a]. Pre-primary educa-
tion programs in Argentina and Uruguay have shown important benefits in the subsequent
years of children’s life. By age 15, children who have attended preschool have accumulated
0.8 extra years of education and are 27 percentage points more likely to be in school as
compared to their untreated siblings [Berlinski et al., 2008]. Children also increase their self
control in third grade when they have attended pre-primary education, [Berlinski et al., 2009].
6[Dong et al., 2004] finds that the likelihood of experience some form of child maltreatment is higher in
the presence of domestic violence at home. Using data from 8,629 adult members of a health plan in the US,
authors find that the prevalence of physical child abuse was 57% for adults who reported earlier domestic
violence exposure and 22% for those who reported no prior exposure. According to figures from the DHS05,
[Profamilia, 2005], in Colombia 39% of women have ever experienced physical violence from her partner.
7Home Observation for Measurement of the Environment scale
8Proyecto Integral de Desarrollo Infantil
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Results found in this paper shed some light on an outcome not analyzed much in early
childhood development studies, child discipline. Evidence provided here shows that early
childhood interventions can affect parents’ behavior by decreasing the use of physical punish-
ment as a way of discipline. Though there is no guide on how to raise a child, psychologists
have suggested what parents should not do. They should not be inconsistent, should not hit
a child when he misbehaves, among others. For low-income parents, poverty-related concerns
consume mental resources, which leaves fewer resources for other tasks, such as parenting
[Anandi et al., 2013]. Social programs can help parents overcoming these constraints.
This paper shows that early childhood interventions addressing mainly health, nutrition
and cognitive development have an extra benefit on parenting behavior. This raises the
question of whether or not interventions focused more on parenting can further boost these
impacts. Studying similar programs in the region could help elicit the program features that
are pushing the change in parents’ behavior, as a way to better understand the mechanisms
at play. Interventions in the region have begun to include home visits to work closer with
parents and the interactions with their children. As a first step, policy makers could include
discipline practices as one of the topics covered in these meetings, to tackle better parents
and children needs.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the setting of the in-
terventions. Section 2 explains the Regression Discontinuity identification strategy in which
the impact of Growth and Development checks is addressed, as well as the data used and
the results. Section 3 explains the Propensity Score Matching used to evaluate the impact
of Hogares Comunitarios, together with the data and the results. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
1 Programs
Over the last decade, the Colombian government has increased its efforts to offer pertinent
services to young children with the goal of providing a comprehensive package of services
for children’s development [ICBF, a,b], [DNP, 2007]. This package of programs encompasses
two components, health and education. The health component is managed by the local
health providers who must guarantee women’s access to contraceptive plans, prenatal care
and breastfeeding training, children’s vaccination schemes and nutritional programs, among
others. The educational component is managed by the Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar
Familiar (ICBF), which offers different kind of programs for pregnant women and mothers of
young children, as well as to children and adolescents. Access to health services in Colombia
can be either through the subsidized or the contributory regime [Bottia et al., 2012]. The
subsidized regime is targeted to the poorest population in the country, those who belong to
Sisben levels 1 and 29.
9In principle, services should not differ whether they are provided by the subsidized or the contributory
regime. However, in practice, differences in quality may arise.
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Table A.1 shows the different kind of programs targeted using the Sisben index. Upper
panel shows the programs targeted to young children, children aged 0-6 years old (y.o.),
and the lower panel the ones targeted to older children and adults. Among the programs
targeted to young children we find the set of programs offered by the ICBF, the subsidized
health regime and Familias en Accion10. Having access to social security offers access to
services such as children’s vaccination schemes and nutritional programs, through growth
and development (G&D) checks. Familias en Accion offers two components, a nutritional
and an educational one. The nutritional component is targeted to children up to 6 y.o and
consists of vaccination and G&D checks for children; and courses of nutrition, hygiene and
contraception for mothers. The educational component targets children 7-17 y.o. The ICBF
offers different kind of child care options, such as Hogares Comunitarios, Hogares Infantiles
and Jardines Comunitarios, which besides providing a child care option to parents, offer talks
to parents on topics such as parenting, child-rearing guidelines, nutritional and health, and
encourage parents to take children to G&D checks.
G&D checks are targeted to children from 0 to 10 years and 11 months, and aim at de-
creasing infant mortality rates through the provision of comprehensive attention to children,
[MinProteccion]. During the first year of age, G&D checks aim at preventing more frequent
illness in the newborn, at encouraging breastfeeding among mothers, and at providing child
care guidelines to parents and care givers. From 1 to 10 y.o., G&D checks are focused on
health checks, child care guidelines, visual assessment, and prevention and promotion of oral
health. Table A.2 describes the outline of G&D checks according to children’s age.
G&D checks cover 3 components, an educational content for parents, development and
growth11. The educational content for parents covers topics such as nutrition, early stimu-
lation, parenting, and prevention and management of frequent illness, and begins to cover
discipline when the child is 13 months old. Parents are encouraged to offer a positive envi-
ronment in which the permanent use of “Do not”12 is avoided, to establish clear but flexible
rules and to listen to the children and respect their opinions. Likewise, the importance of
limiting the use of physical punishment is emphasized. The development evaluation focuses
on gross and fine motor skills, speech-language and hearing, and personal/social skills. The
growth evaluation contains a medical exam and a nutritional check. Table A.3 shows an
example of the protocol that should be followed in the G&D check for children 13-16 months
old. From qualitative interviews with people in charge of G&D checks, the procedure in
case of observing signs of physical abuse or maltreatment changes according to the health
provider. In some cases, mothers are sent to therapies with the psychologist; in others the
ICBF is called and the child is put under its supervision until parents show to be capable of
taking care of him13. In most public child care options, as well as in public schools, it is a
10Familias en Accion is a Conditional Cash Transfer program implemented in since 1992 and it is only
targeted to population in Sisben level 1.
11Every check last approximately 1 hour
12Using sentences such as don’t touch, don’t do, etc.
13Usually a form should be filled up in which the information on the event observed is registered. For the
particular case of Bogota, the local health department (Secretaria de Salud) has an information system in
which all events of domestic violence, child maltreatment or sexual abuse should be registered (Sistema de
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requirement to show that the child has attended the G&D checks up to date in order to enroll.
Among the programs offered by the ICFB, we find Hogares Comunitarios de Bienes-
tar (HCB). HCB is a home-based childcare program established in Colombia since 198614,
with the main goal of providing a childcare option for vulnerable population and promoting
women’s labor force participation [Bernal et al., 2009], [Bernal and Fernandez, 2013]. Tradi-
tional HCB childcare homes are led by a Madre Comunitaria (Mother from the community),
who hosts 12 to 14 children from 2 to 5 years old15. Children should receive up to 70% of the
daily allowance of supplementary nutrition, as well as promotion of physical growth, health,
social and cognitive development. Madres Comunitarias should be between 18 to 45 y.o,
have at least a high school level, and have lived in the neighborhood where the HCB is going
to operate for at least a year16.
Parents who want to enroll their children in a HCB17 need to not only have their children
registered in the G&D checks, but also to show that checks are up to date. Besides, Madres
Comunitarias encourage G&D attendance and vaccination [Bernal et al., 2009]. Madres Co-
munitarias also organize bimonthly meetings with parents in which they cover different topics
such as nutrition, health, parenting, domestic violence, among others. The topics covered
in these talks are chosen by the Madres Comunitarias based on the needs detected from
the interaction with the children, the parents and the community, as well as the suggestions
received by the ICBF18.
Children who wish to attend any of the childcare options offered by the ICBF should fulfill
vigilancia epidemiologica de la violencia intrafamiliar, el maltrato infantil y la violencia sexual (SIVIM))
14Hogares Infantiles were created in 1974, then in 1986 the coverage was extended with the
HCB. Among HCB there are different modalities, traditional, grouped and corporate childcare homes
[DNP, 2009], being the traditional childcare homes the ones that account for around 65% of the
total beneficiary population (Figure taken based on the number of beneficiaries by February 2014.
https://sinergia.dnp.gov.co/portaldnp/default.aspx). Grouped childcare homes are those where 2 madres
comunitarias gather together to provide service to 26-28 children. Corporate childcare homes have the sup-
port of a company aiming at providing childcare to the employees’ children. Corporate childcare homes
receive children from 0 to 6 y.o and usually host around 40 children. For these childcare homes, the monthly
fee is a bit higher as compared to the one of traditional childcare homes. Besides these childcare homes,
there is another program that targets pregnant women and children 0-2 y.o, Hogares FAMI (Familia, Mujer e
Infancia). These homes are mostly located in rural disperse areas and tackle non-working women, they aim
at boosting the relation between mothers and children, though not provide childcare as the HCB.
15From qualitative interviews with people in charge of the program, the ICBF encourages madres comuni-
tarias to receive children from 2 years old given that younger children require special care. However, when a
madre comunitaria receives children younger than 2 y.o, she should not receive more than 1.
16All Madres Comunitarias are required to attend a 40-hours pre-service training on child development,
health, nutrition, safety, and community participation [Bernal and Fernandez, 2013]. Though Madres Comu-
nitarias, their homes and the services they provide should fulfill into the criteria defined by the ICBF, there
is great variation on the quality of the service provided [Bernal et al., 2009], [DNP, 2009].
17HCB usually host children between 8am and 3pm. Children follow a schedule given by different moments
organized as follow, 1) Welcome, 2) Let’s explore, 3) Let’s create, 4) Let’s play, 5) Let’s eat and 6) Let’s go
home, [ICBF, 2006].
18Madres Comunitarias encourage both parents to participate in these meetings, though is mostly mothers
the ones who attend.
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the following criteria [ICBF, 2013]: Have less than 5 years and 11 months of age, belong to
Red Unidos19, belong to Sisben levels 1 and 220, and have a family income up to 1.5 daily
minimum wages (ONLY for Hogar Infantil). Priority is also given to displaced population.
2 Impact of Growth and Development checks on Child
Discipline
2.1 Sisben
Colombia has two methods for targeting social spending. One is a geographical targeting in-
strument, called Socio-economic Stratification21, used mostly to target subsidies for potable
water and electricity. The other one is a proxy-means test instrument, known as System for
Selecting Beneficiaries of Social Spending (Sisben), which is based on assessment of living
conditions on individual families [Castañeda, 2005]. The Sisben index is a function of a set of
household demographic characteristics and variables related to the consumption of durable
goods, capital endowments and current income [Castaño et al., 1999]. The Sisben has been
widely used since 1994 to target subsidies for health insurance, scholarships, conditional cash
transfers, public works, youth training and subsidies for elderly poor and children, among
others, [Castañeda, 2005]. The Sisben Index ranks from 0 to 100, and 6 levels are defined.
From 1995 on, different methodologies22 have been implemented to compute the Sisben index,
trying to overcome caveats observed in its implementation and possible manipulation by ben-
eficiaries and municipal authorities [Castañeda, 2005], [Camacho et al., 2010], [Bottia et al.,
2012], [Camacho and Conover, 2009]. For the current analysis, the methodology that holds
is Methodology II given that the year of interest is 2005. Table A.4 shows the thresholds
defined with this methodology. Thresholds are different for urban and rural population.
Some studies have exploited the discontinuity in program eligibility based on the Sisben
index. [Barrera-Osorio et al., 2007] exploit the discontinuity for the Gratuidad program in
Bogotá23, finding that the fee reductions offered to individuals in Sisben 1 and 2 have a
positive effect on enrollment. Impact is found for primary enrollment for students in Sisben
level 1, and in high school enrollment for students in Sisben level 2.
Table A.1 shows that different programs targeted to different age groups use the Sisben
index, making it difficult to isolate the impact of only one program. However, it is possible to
19Families registered in the Red Unidos correspond to families in the lowest quintile of families belonging
to Sisben level 1, that is, the poorest population in the country. For more information on Red Unidos:
http://www.anspe.gov.co/es/programa/estrategia-unidos
20From 2011-2012 programs began to be targeted with the newest methodology of the Sisben, Methodology
III. Thresholds for program eligibility change from program to program with this new methodology. Now
programs are not assigned to particular levels but to particular groups depending on the thresholds[ICBF,
2013]
21Based on assessment of the outside characteristics of neighborhoods and dwellings.
22Methodology I from 1995-2002, methodology II from 2003-2010 and methodology III from 2011 on.
23Gratuidad is a program providing school fee reductions for enrollment in primary and secondary
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look at the impact of the set of programs using the Sisben index. Given that the population
of interest of a large part of these programs is children, particularly young children; I seek
to establish how the package of programs targeting Sisben levels 1 and 2 impact children
discipline, and shed light on which program seems to be the one driving the results.
2.2 Data
To implement the Regression Discontinuity (RD) analysis I use the Demographic and Health
Survey of 2005 (DHS05). In this round, the survey asked women for the Sisben score; how-
ever, a large number of respondents did not remember either one of them or both, and data
turned out quite noisy and with a lot of missing values24. Because of this, governmental au-
thorities decided to re-compute the Sisben index based on the socio-economic characteristics
reported in the survey, and using the official formula and weights25.
The DHS is a National representative survey of women in reproductive age (15-49 y.o),
providing information on household characteristics, woman reproductive history, contracep-
tion, pregnancy, children’s health and vaccination, sexual behavior, fertility, AIDS and do-
mestic violence. I focus on the sample of women with children 0-18 y.o. residing in urban
areas. I decided to focus only on urban areas given that around 80% of households reside in
urban areas (capital municipalities and seat of the municipal government), which leaves not
enough observations to have enough power to estimate a regression discontinuity around the
eligibility threshold for rural areas.
The DHS has an extensive section on Domestic Violence, covering how parents disci-
pline children under 18 y.o. The question is asked separately for mother and father way of
punishment, and provides information on the occurrence rather than on the frequency26. I
implement a factor analysis to create a variable describing the way parents discipline chil-
dren, following [Attanasio et al., 2015]27. A latent factor model is usually done to investigate
concepts that are not easily and directly measured. In this case, different observed variables
are associated with parental discipline, the variable I am interested in measuring. The factor
analysis allows me to understand the patterns across the different observed variables, helping
me to identify different forms of parental discipline.
For the factor analysis, I first selected a sub-sample of the ways to discipline children,
based on the rates in which each of them is used. I selected those that have a rate higher
than 1%. Table A.5 shows the rates in which each measure of child discipline is used. The
sub-sample in which I focus includes the following: spanking, pushing, verbal reprimand,
24There is no answer on Sisben level for around 40% of the sample and no answer on Sisben index for
nearly 88%.
25The official formula and weights are not publicly available
26Question is framed to get information on how children in the household are punished, rather than how
each child in the household is punished. For each possible way of punishment it is asked whether or not the
parent punishes children in that way. Answers are given by the woman.
27But contrary to [Attanasio et al., 2015], I do not assume a dedicated measurement system, that is one
in which each measure only proxies one factor
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prohibiting something children like, hitting with objects, keeping children looked up and ig-
noring them. As it can be seen, all of them point out towards a neglecting or physical way to
discipline children. Using these seven ways of discipline, I obtained three factors for fathers
and mothers disciplining methods, factors which eigenvalues are larger than one28. Table 1
shows the description for each of the factors. For both, mothers and fathers, the loads for
factor 1 are always positive; while for factor 2 and 3, some loads are positive and other
are negative29. Ways of discipline, such as verbal reprimand or prohibiting children some-
thing they like, can be considered as neglecting ways of discipline. However, the information
provided in the survey is not enough to clearly establish if these methods corresponds to
aggressive or non-aggressive ways of disciplining. For example, we do not know if the verbal
reprimand corresponds to shouting or dialoguing with the child. I consider that this may help
explaining why in some cases the loadings are positive and in others they are negative. When
we compare the loadings of the different factors between mothers and fathers, we observe
than factor 1 loads mainly on physical ways of disciplining, such as pushing and spanking.
While, factor 2 and 3, load on a mix of physical and neglecting punishment; and loadings do
not always point in the same direction30. Table A.6 shows the factor loadings for the gender
based violence analysis. This analysis suggested two factor which eigenvalues were larger
than 1. In this case, factor 1 loads mainly on aggressive and physical ways of violence, while
factor 2 loads mainly on controlling behaviors.
2.3 Identification Strategy
Table A.1 showed that a large number of programs, targeted to population in Sisben levels
1 and 2, are focused on young children. The only program targeted exclusively to Sisben
1 is Familias en Accion, which also includes G&D checks. Families in Sisben 1 and 2 have
access to a relatively similar and large supply of programs as compared to families in Sisben
3, therefore the current analysis focuses only on the threshold from Sisben 2 to 3. In the
Suplementary Appendix, estimations of discontinuity on G&D checks in the threshold from
Sisben 1 to 2 are provided, showing no evidence of a discontinuity31. Though attendance
to G&D checks is a requirement to receive the transfer of Familias en Accion, there is also
an enforcement mechanism for households in Sisben 2. One of the requirements to attend a
Hogar Comunitario is to show that the G&D checks are up date.
The Sisben index provided at the DHS05 corresponds to a re-computed index, done by
governmental authorities and using the official formula and weights32. Although it uses the
official algorithm, it may be the case it differs from the original index because the data
28For those three factors the eigenvalues are 1.27, 1.15 and 1, respectively
29To estimate the factor, I use the regression scoring (Thomson (1951)), which is defined as: fˆ = Φ∧′Σ−1x.
Where, Φ is the correlation matrix of the common factors, ∧ represents the factor loading matrix, and x the
vector of observed variables
30For both, fathers and mothers, Factor 1 explains 18% of the total variance, Factor 2, 16% and Factor 3,
15%.
31DHS05 data doesn’t provide information on Familias en Accion participation, not allowing to test for a
discontinuity.
32Formula and weights that are not publicly available.
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sources are different. Figure 1 shows the distributions of the Sisben index computed with
data from the Sisben survey (top graph); and of the one re-computed using DHS05 data
(bottom graph). Distributions differ particular at the left tail. At the left tail there is a
higher density when using the Sisben survey. Around the threshold of interest (Sisben index
22) distributions behave relatively similar. The date of data collection of the DHS falls just in
the middle of the time period in which data for the Sisben survey was collected33. This allows
to think that on average, households may not have substantially changed their consumption
of durable goods or the household physical characteristics. Based on this evidence, I rely on
the Sisben index computed with the DHS05 data.
In order to get consistent estimators through a RD analysis, it is important to test for
manipulation of the forcing variable and discontinuity in variables that can affect the outcome
of interest [Lee and Lemieux, 2010]. Studies have shown evidence of possible manipulation
of the Sisben index, particularly by local authorities and using data from the previous Sisben
Methodologies (Methodology I), [Camacho and Conover, 2009]. Manipulation is not a big
concern for the current analysis because of two main reasons. First, the methodology that
applies is a subsequent methodology (Methodology II), which was designed trying to over-
come possible manipulation problems. Second, the index provided at the DHS05 is based
on a survey which purpose was not to collect data to compute the index and target social
programs, putting strategic answer as a second order problem. Anyhow, I test for continuity
in the running variable. Figure 2 shows the graph corresponding to the McCrary Density
test [McCrary, 2008], which provides evidence of continuity of the running variable around
the threshold.
The Sisben index is computed based on a set of household demographic characteristics
and variables related to the consumption of durable goods, capital endowments and current
income. I check for possible discontinuities on the variables used to compute the Sisben
index, as well as on the wealth index provided at the DHS0534. The wealth index is included
to rule out that the differences observed are due to wealth rather than to access to programs.
All subsequent estimations, to test for discontinuities around the threshold, will corre-
spond to Equation 135:
yi = α0 + β11 {Si ≥ 22} + β2f2(S˜i) + β3f2(S˜i) ∗ 1 {Si ≥ 22} + β4Ci + µi (1)
Where yi is the outcome of interest at the individual or household level. Si is the Sisben
index. S˜i = Si − 22 is the normalized score. 1 {Si ≥ 22} identifies those who are after the
33The data collection for the Sisben, Methodology II, took place between January 2003 and July 2007
34The wealth index is a composite measure of a household’s cumulative living standard provided in the
DHS. It’s calculated based on data on households ownership of selected assets, such as televisions and bicycles;
materials used for housing construction; and types of water access and sanitation facilities. DHS separates
all interviewed households into five wealth quintiles to compare the influence of wealth on various population,
health and nutrition indicators. Taken from http://dhsprogram.com/topics/Wealth-Index.cfm on July 30th
2014
35The Suplementary Appendix contains the estimations with a linear polynomial
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threshold and f2(S˜i) corresponds to a quadratic polynomial on the normalized score, which I
allow to be different after the threshold with the interaction f2(S˜i)∗1 {Si ≥ 22}. C represents
a the set of household controls36. Impact of the program is given by β1, which represents the
change in y at the eligibility threshold, in this case 22.
All estimations presented next are either on the rank [19-25] or the rank [18-26] . The test
for optimal bandwidth proposed by [Imbens and Kalyanaraman, 2010] suggested a bandwidth
of 2.6. I perform some heterogeneity analysis, for I which I divide my sample. Therefore,
in these cases I run the estimations on the rank [18-26] to get power on the estimations.
Table 2 shows the sample size for children and mothers in the Sisben score ranks: [18-26] and
[19-25], for each of the children’s age ranges of interest: children 0-4 y.o, children 0-18 y.o
in households with at least a child 0-4 y.o, and children 5-18 y.o in households with no child
0-4 y.o. First panel shows the observations for all children; second panel for those for which
I have information on discipline methods; and third panel for those that I have information
on discipline and on all controls used (eg. household composition, woman and partner’s age
and education, and wealth index).
Results from Table A.7 do not show a systematic difference around the threshold in the
variables used to compute the Sisben index. Although evidence of a possible discontinuity
is observed in the socio-economic strata, number of toilets, owning a water heater or oven,
and number members older than 65 y.o; not all changes point in the same direction and in
some cases discontinuities are quite sensible to the order of the polynomial used. All follow-
ing estimations will include as controls household composition by age group37, woman’s and
partner’s education and age; and the household wealth index.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Main Results
DHS05 data provide information on HCB attendance for children 0-6 y.o. and G&D checks
for children 0-4 y.o.38 Using this information, I take into account number of G&D checks
attended, having attended at least 3 G&D checks39 and attendance to a HCB. Figure 3 sug-
gests a discontinuity in the likelihood that a child has attended at least 3 G&D checks.
Table 3 shows the estimation of Equation 1 for programs’ attendance. Results are given
for number of G&D checks attended over last 12 months, attendance to at least 3 G&D checks
and attendance to HCB. Children 0-4 y.o belonging to households right above the threshold
of Sisben level 2 are 27 percentage points less likely to attend at least 3 G&D checks. On
average, the likelihood that children above the threshold attend at least 3 G&D checks is
36This term is not included when I test for discontinuities in the variables used to compute the Sisben
index
370-6 y.o., 7-14 y.o., 15-24 y.o., 25-64 y.o. and 65 y.o. and above
38I focus on children 0-4 y.o because for them I have information on both programs.
39Table A.2 shows the optimal number of G&D checks children must attend according to their age, on
average, children up to 4 y.o should attend 3 checks during a year.
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23%, while it is 50% for those below the threshold. As it can be seen, results are pretty
similar for all type of households, are well as for households with mother and father present.
Though attendance to HCB is lower after the threshold, it is not statistically significant. The
lack of discontinuity in HCB attendance can have two probable explanations. First, Madres
Comunitarias can ask ICBF authorities to allow children, who do not belong to Sisben 2 but
who are in a vulnerable situation, to enroll into the program. Second, corporate HCB aim
to benefit employee’s children and some of them may belong to households in Sisben level 3.
Figure 4 and Figure 5 show the pattern of each of the factors (standardized) of disciplining
methods of fathers and mothers, around the threshold. The figures suggest a discontinuity
in factor 1 of mothers and fathers. For the other two factors, the graphical analysis does not
seem to suggest a difference between those before and those after the threshold40. This result
seems to be consistent to what was found in the factor description presented in Section 2.2,
where it was not clear whether factor 2 and 3 pointed towards an aggressive or non-aggresive
way of disciplining. I decide to focus my analysis only on factor 1 because of two main rea-
sons. On one hand, factor one explains most of the variation (18%), all loadings are positive
and the main loadings point towards an aggressive way to discipline children. One the other
hand, the main loadings for factor 1 are the same for fathers and mothers way of disciplining:
spanking, pushing and ignoring. This latter characteristic allows me to compare factor 1
between mothers and fathers. The other two factors point to different types of discipline,
making it difficult not only to establish whether they describe aggressive discipline practices;
but making it difficult to compare them between mothers and fathers.
Table 4 shows the estimation of Equation 1 for factor 1 (standardized) of fathers and
mothers. As was suggested by the figures, fathers above the threshold of Sisben 2 are 0.37
standard deviations more likely to use physical and neglecting ways to discipline their chil-
dren, as compared to fathers below the threshold. As before, results are very much the same
between all households and households with mother and father present. I decided to work
with the whole sample of children (eg. children 0-18 y.o.), because what is learned for the
children 0-4 y.o, who attend the G&D checks, can be also used to discipline other children in
the household. I also used the whole sample of children because the question that is asked
is “How father/mother discipline children 0-18 y.o in the household”, rather than how each
child is disciplined41.
Given that no particular difference arises by whether or not the father is present at home,
all the subsequent analysis will focus on all type of households. In 67% of the households
children are disciplined by both parents, in 27% only by the mother, and in 4% only by the
father. I also estimate the impact of fathers and mothers’ discipline methods, conditional on
whether both parents punish the children42. Table 5 shows a higher impact on father’s way
of discipline. Fathers above the threshold of Sisben 2 are 0.6 standard deviations more likely
to use physical and neglecting ways to discipline their children, as compared to fathers below
the threshold.
40Though graphically it seems to be a discontinuity on factor 3 for fathers, it’s no statistically significant
41This the reason why the number of observations are larger in Table 4, as compared to Table 3
42I did not find an impact on whether it is the mother or the father the one who punishes
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I also implemented a heterogeneity analysis by looking at differences of whether or not
the mother works outside the household. Women who don’t work or who work inside the
household, may spend more time with their children and, presumably, could be more under
stress. Therefore it’ll be interesting to see in which group the intervention is more effective
at generating an impact. Table 6 shows the results on program attendance by whether or
not mothers work outside the household4344. Results show that children from households
above the threshold of Sisben 2, from both type of mothers, are around 0.3 percentage points
less likely to attend at least 3 G&D checks over last month. Though it is only statistically
significant for mothers who work inside the household or do not work, the point estimate in
the other group is not significantly different. Table 7 shows the results on child discipline.
Though attendance to the health checks didn’t show any particular difference between the
two type of households, a change in parents’ behavior is seen only in households in which the
mother work outside the household. Besides, in this type of households a change in behavior
is also observed for mothers. Fathers and mothers above the Sisben 2 threshold increase the
use of physical and neglecting ways of discipline by around 1 standard deviation. Figure 6
shows the corresponding graphs for mothers and fathers way of discipline when the mother
works outside the household.
Table A.8 shows some household characteristics describing the whole sample, the sample
of mothers that work outside the household and the sample of mothers that do not. House-
holds in which women work outside the household have fewer children 0-6 y.o., women and
partners are more educated, and women are older. Based on previous figures, we may think
that the fact that parents are more educated (eg. parents that are more likely to have tech-
nical post-secondary education), is playing an important role for the intervention to generate
a change in behavior.
To check if in fact mothers’ education is playing a role, I implemented a heterogeneity
analysis by whether or not mother’s education is higher than secondary45. Table 8 shows the
results on attendance to at least 3 G&D checks. Difference in G&D checks is nearly significant
in both groups and the magnitude of the change is not significantly different neither across
the two type of households, nor as compared to the full sample. Children above the Sisben 2
threshold are 0.26 percentage points less likely to attend at least 3 G&D checks over the last
12 months. Table 9 shows that, as expected, the difference in discipline practices is seen in
households with highly educated mothers and, fathers46. In households with highly educated
mothers, fathers above the Sisben 2 threshold increase the use of physical and neglecting
ways of discipline by 0.6 standard deviations. Though change in mother’s behavior is not
43Around 40% of women work outside the household. I tested for whether or not there was a discontinuity
on the likelihood mothers work outside the household at the threshold of interest, and there is no discontinuity.
44Given that the sample was separately into women that work outside the household, and women that
work inside the household or do not work, I decided to present the estimations on the rank [18-26] to gain
power for my estimations.
45Around 17% of mothers have education higher than secondary.
46On average, partner’s education is secondary for mothers with education secondary or lower; and technical
post secondary for mothers with education higher than secondary.
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statistically significant, the magnitude of the change is nearly the same as the one observed
for fathers. Figure 7 shows the corresponding graphs for mothers and fathers way of discipline
according to mother’s education. Though the differences observed in child disciplining go in
the same direction for households where mothers work outside the household, or households
with more educated mothers; magnitudes are higher in the first case. This may be suggesting
that there may be some unobserved characteristics that make households with mothers that
work outside more willing to change their discipline practices.
2.4.2 Robustness Checks
The Sisben index is used to target different programs to young children, old children and
adults. With this work, I aim to establish the impact of the package of social programs,
particularly social programs targeted to young children, on parents’ disciplining methods.
Therefore, the presence of young children in the household is going to be essential for the
change in parents’ behavior. I use the sample of children 5-18 y.o. in households with no
child 0-4 y.o. to do a placebo test47. The change in behavior may not be necessarily coming
from programs targeted to young children if an impact is found in this sample. Table A.9
shows that in households where there is no child 0-4 y.o, there is no evidence of a change
in parents’ disciplining methods. This ensures that the impact is coming from programs
targeted to young children, rather than from other programs or from other variables that
could change at the threshold.
As I previously mentioned, I decided to work with the whole sample of children 0-18 y.o.
given the way the question was framed and the fact that discipline practices learned for one
child may be used with the rest of the children. However, it may be expected that the main
change in behavior is going to come from the discipline practices used with children 0-4 y.o.
The upper panel of Table A.10 shows the results for discipline practices used with children
0-4 y.o, and lower panel with children 5-18 y.o (in households with at least a child 0-4 y.o.)
For father’s ways of disciplining, magnitudes are not particularly different between children
0-4 y.o. and children 5-18 y.o. For mothers, results are not significant for either group, but
the point estimates do point in opposite directions, possible suggesting that the change in
behavior is concentrated on the younger children.
Another way to check that the impact is coming from the package of programs targeted to
young children is to check at spousal violence. If an impact is observed in the violence of the
partner towards the woman, then it may be that either other program is pushing the change
in behavior, or some other household variables change at the threshold. Besides, given the
evidence that households that experience spousal violence are more likely to experience child
maltreatment, and vice versa; a reduction in spousal violence may be part of the mechanism
underlying the results on child disciplining. Table A.11 shows the impact on the two factors
describing gender based violence. Results show that there is no change in this type of violence.
47In 46% households have at least 1 member 0-4 y.o
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Table A.12 check for differences in other outcomes that may affect levels of violence at
home, such as women’s empowerment, women’s marriage history or the number of children
living outside and inside the household. To approach women’s empowerment I also imple-
mented a factor analysis. For the factor analysis I used measures of women empowerment
such as education; labor participation; use of contraceptive methods; if she considers that
a woman can refuse having sex with her partner if she does not want; if she participates in
household decisions such as which type of food to buy and cook, and visiting family and
friends; and if she is the only who decides how to spend her income. The factor analysis sug-
gested three factors. Factor 1 loads mainly on participation in household decisions and the
use of contraceptive methods. Factor 2 loads on income and education. And factor 3 loads
on agreement to refuse to have sex and the use of contraceptive methods. I decide to focus
on factor 1 because it explains most of the variation (20%)48; and also because factor 2 had
already been indirectly approached through the estimations presented in Table A.7, where I
check for discontinuities in the variables used to compute the Sisben score. Table A.12 shows
no evidence for a discontinuity on factor 1 (standardized) of women’s empowerment.
For women’s marriage history, I take into account if she has been in more than one union
and age at first marriage, no discontinuity is found in any of them. Finally, I look at number
of children living outside and inside the household, as one may think that children leave home
in the presence of a violent environment, again no differences are found. The fact I don’t
find a difference around the threshold on any of these outcomes suggests that the channel
through which the intervention is impacting is through the attendance to the G&D checks,
rather than through other factors that may make these households different. In order for chil-
dren to enroll in a public school or child care option, parents need to show that the child has
up to date the G&D checks. Public schools are quite inflexible with this requirement, which
works as an enforcement mechanism for parents to take children on time to the G&D checks49.
G&D checks aims at decreasing infant mortality. For this reason, it is possible that the
program is also impacting anthropometric outcomes, such as weight-for-age and height-for-
age. In the DHS05, for some of these variables there is a high presence of missing data, which
makes the estimations subject to bias and lack of power. Among the 959 children 0-4 y.o. in
the Sisben rank [18-26], there is information on weight for 856 and on height for 851 children.
After computing the z scores, there is information on weight-for-age for 851, height-for-age
for 522 and weight-for-height for 640 children50. Table A.13 displays the results for these
three outcomes for all children, and boys and girls separately, showing no impact on any of
them51.
48The variation explained by factor 2 is 18% and by factor 3, 16%
49The target population of G&D checks is a quite vulnerable population. From qualitative interviews with
people in charge of the G&D checks, it seems that mothers see a lot of advantages in taking their children
to the checks, even if they may receive a sanction in case the child has been physically punished. Also, it
may be that in some cases (though not that many), mothers do not dare to report that their partners punish
their children physically, and prefer for doctors to find out.
50I control for weight and height at birth. Weight is available for 832 and height for 753
51Given the few observations I have for some of the outcomes, I decided to work on the rank [18-26].
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Besides the factor analysis to approach parents’ disciplining behavior, I also defined two
additional indicators. I define physical punishment as slaps, pushing, feeding deprivation,
hitting with objects, leaving them locked, forcing them to do inadequate activities and throw-
ing them water. With these categories I built two different indicators, number of yes and any
yes. Table A.14 shows the corresponding results for all type of households and households
where the father is present. Results go in line to what was found with the factor analysis.
There is a higher use of physical ways of discipline by fathers whose children attend less fre-
quently the G&D checks (eg. Those above the Sisben 2 threshold). On the other hand, with
this set of indicators, a higher use of physical ways of discipline is also observed in mothers
who are in a union.
The Suplementary Appendix presents the estimations with a liner polynomial. It also
provides the results when instrumenting attendance to at least 3 G&D checks (during the
year), with a dummy identifying those after the threshold. Results from the IV go in the
same direction.
3 Impact of Hogares Comunitarios on Discipline
3.1 Data
To provide additional evidence on how social programs affect parental discipline strategies
used with their children, I implement a Propensity Score Matching (PSM) estimation using
the data from the evaluation of HCB. For the evaluation of Hogares Comunitarios de Bi-
enestar (HCB), data was collected between February and July of 2007. The sample covers
1,042 HCB and a bit more than 26,000 children nationwide [Bernal et al., 2009]. Beneficiary
children were selected from a random sample of HCB in 47 (out of 1,100) municipalities in
Colombia. Non-beneficiary children were sampled from children 0-6 y.o who satisfied pro-
gram eligibility criteria52, live in the same areas of influence as the 1,042 HCB included in
the study, but were not enrolled in the program [Bernal and Fernandez, 2013]. Data gath-
ers information on socio-economic characteristics of children and their families, as well as
outcome variables to measure the impact of the program on nutrition, health, cognitive and
non-cognitive development of participant children [Bernal et al., 2009].
The sample includes children who were attending a HCB at the moment of the survey,
children who have previously attended and children who have never attended. I only focus
on children who attend a HCB at the moment of the survey. I focus on children 2-5 y.o as,
in principle, Madres Comunitarias should only receive children from 2 y.o. Table 10 shows
the sample size for children 2-5 y.o. who have attended at least 2 months the Hogar Comuni-
tario for all type of households, households with mother and father present, households with
working mothers, and households with non-working mothers53.
52Basically belonging to Sisben levels 1 and 2.
53As compared to the Regression Discontinuity analysis, the data for the HCB analysis do not provide
information on whether or not women work outside the household.
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Data provides information on how the mother punishes the child when he does not want
to eat and when he does not want to obey. It does not provide information on how the father
disciplines the child. Questions are framed to get information on frequency, rather than only
on occurrence54. As in the case of the Regression Discontinuity Analysis, I implemented a
factor analysis to define the measures of child discipline. I decided to put together measures
of child disciplining used when the child doesn’t want to eat, and when the child doesn’t want
to behave. I also decided to work with the factors that had an eigenvalue strictly larger than
1, which corresponds to six factors. Table 11 shows that measures of both type of situations,
when the child does not want to eat and when the child does not want to obey, load on each of
the six factors. Factor 1 loads mainly on physical ways of discipline, such as forcing the child
to eat and hitting him with an object or with the hand. Factor 2 loads mainly on pedagogic
ways of discipline, such as explaining the importance of obeying or eating. Factor 3 and 5
load mostly on neglecting ways of discipline, such as taking out the plate of food or sending
the child to another room in the house. Finally, Factor 4 loads on a mix of pedagogic and
neglecting ways of discipline, such as playing the child when he doesn’t want to eat or verbal
reprimand; and Factor 6 loads on combination of physical and neglecting ways of discipline55.
Estimations on the impact of Hogares Comuntarios are done using the first 5 factors derived
from the analysis, as factor 6 only loads on 2 measures.
I also implement a factor analysis for children’s behavior. I work with some direct ques-
tions regarding children’s behavior asked in the survey. I use behaviors referring to children’s
interaction with other children and, children’s responsibility and independence56. The factor
analysis provides three factors, which eigenvalue is larger than one. I focus my analysis on
those three factors. Table 12 displays the factor loadings for each of the measures of child’s
behavior. Factor 1 loads mainly on measures pointing a good behavior at interacting with
other children and at following instructions. Factor 2 loads mostly on measures of bad be-
havior at interacting with other children and, Factor 3 mainly on measures of bad behavior
at respecting and following instructions.
3.2 Identification Strategy
[Bernal and Fernandez, 2013] find evidence that treated children seem to come from more
vulnerable households, which raises concerns of self-selection into the program. Selection into
the program can be due to observable and unobservable characteristics. Among the observ-
able characteristics, there is parents’ education, age and labor force participation; children’s
age, gender and health; and household composition. Among the unobservable characteristics
we can have parents’ preferences or children’s ability.
54The possible answers are never (1), sometimes (2), almost every time (3) and always (4).
55To estimate the factor, I use the regression scoring (Thomson (1951)), which is defined as: fˆ = Φ∧′Σ−1x.
Where, Φ is the correlation matrix of the common factors, ∧ represents the factor loading matrix, and x the
vector of observed variables.
56For each of the behaviors, mothers were asked to classify into always, sometimes and never, the behavior
of their children in that particular aspect.
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Following [Behrman et al., 2004a], [Heckman and Todd, 2009], [Bernal and Fernandez,
2013], I compare children according to the length of exposure to the program. [Bernal et al.,
2009], show that the program is impacting those that have attended the HCB at least 16
months. I therefore compare children exposed 16 months or more to those exposed 2-15
months. Selection on observables is controlled for in two ways. First, beneficiary chil-
dren were selected from a random sample of HCBs in 47 (out of 1,100) municipalities in
Colombia and non-beneficiary children were sampled from children 0-6 y.o. who satisfied
program eligibility criteria57, live in the same areas of influence but were not enrolled in the
program [Bernal and Fernandez, 2013]. Second, estimations combine regression and propen-
sity score weighting through a Double-Robust estimator, following [Imbens and Wooldridge,
2009]. Combining regression and weighting can lead to additional robustness by removing
the correlation between the omitted variables and, by reducing the correlation between the
omitted and the included variables. Regarding selection on unobservable characteristics I
do not have a good instrument that would allow me to control explicitly for selection on
unobservables. Instead, I include variables in the PSM that could serve as proxies of parents
preferences, such as if the mother is the main care giver of the child and if quality was the
main reason to choose the care option. I decided to work only with a sample of children
who are attending a HCB and exploit differences in length of exposure to avoid concerns
regarding selection into the program. However, after controlling for observed characteristics
that I consider may affect the length of exposure to the program, it is possible that there
may be unobserved variables that determine how long a child stays in a HCB.
Tables A.15 shows some descriptive statistics for the two groups of interest, children who
have been exposed to the program 16 months or more and those that have been exposed only
2-15 months, for all type of households; while Table A.16 shows the descriptives for house-
holds where the father is present. Similar to what was found by [Bernal and Fernandez,
2013], children who have been exposed for a longer period of time to the program seem to
come from more vulnerable households. Parents are less educated and there are more children
0-6 y.o. at home. The Suplementary Appendix presents the descriptive statistics for working
and non-working mothers, as well as for high and low educated mothers, characteristics that
I use to implement a heterogeneity analysis.
Figure 4 shows the graphs of the estimations of Equation 2 comparing children who have
attended at least 16 months to the program to those that have attended 2-15 months.
e(x) = Pr(Wi = 1|Xi = x) = p(x; γ)58 (2)
where x is a vector of covariates. W is a binary indicator of participation: having at-
tended 16 months or more.
57Basically belonging to Sisben levels 1 and 2.
58p(x; γ) = exp(γ0 + x′γ1)/(1 + exp(γ0 + x′γ1))
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Variables used for the estimation of the propensity score include child and parents’ char-
acteristics, households physical characteristics and variables identifying HCB availability and
reasons for choosing the care option. Figure 4 shows that the distributions of the propensity
score provide a good common support between treatment and control in each comparison
group. The Suplementary Appendix has the figures for the other samples of interest59.
The PSM is done using kernel estimator60. Estimations are done within the common
support, which is defined by dropping treatment observations whose pscore is higher than
the maximum or less than the minimum pscore of the controls. Table A.17 shows the balance
test by strata using the weights from the PSM estimation61. The Suplementary Appendix
contains the balance test for the other sub-samples of interest. Apart from some minor differ-
ences, results show that the sample is relatively well balanced across treatment and control.
The following results will refer to the Double-Robust estimator using the weights from the
propensity scores.
For the Double-Robust estimator, in the first step γ is estimated by maximum likelihood
and then the propensity scores, eˆ(Xi) = p(x; γˆ). In the second step, a linear regression is
used where the objective function is weighted by the inverse probability of treatment and
non-treatment. We can think of the objective function to be given by Equation 3
E(Yw|x) = αw + β′w(x− X¯) for w = 0, 1 (3)
Then, to estimate (α0, β0) and (α1, β1), the weighted least square problem is solved:
minα0,β0
∑
i:Wi=0
(Yi − α0 − β′0(Xi − X¯))2
p(Xi; γˆ)
minα1,β1
∑
i:Wi=1
(Yi − α1 − β′1(Xi − X¯))2
1− p(Xi; γˆ) (4)
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Main Results
The upper panel of Table 13 shows the results for all types of households, and the lower panel
for households where the father is present; for the five factors (standardized) of disciplining
methods. Results suggest that there are not particular differences between the two type of
households. Mothers of children who have been longer into the program use neglecting ways
59Households where the father is present, with working mothers, with non-working mothers, with high
educated mothers and with low educated mothers
60Caliper=0.2
61Following [Imbens, 2004]
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of discipline (Factor 3), such as ignoring the child or taking off the plate of food, by around
0.6 standard deviations more. This group of mothers also use more a combination of peda-
gogic and neglecting ways of discipline (Factor 4). This set of results provides mixed evidence
regarding whether mothers are moving towards more positive oriented ways of discipline, the
longer their children have been in the program. However, when I perform the heterogeneity
analysis by women’s labor status and education, results suggest a much clearer movement
towards positive ways of disciplining.
Following the hypothesis that non-working mothers or mothers that work inside the house-
hold may be more under stress. I implement a heterogeneity analysis by whether or not the
mother participate in the labor market62 to see if the program is more efficient in a particular
group. The upper panel of Table 14 shows the results for working mothers and the lower
panel for non-working mothers. Similar to what was found in the regression discontinuity
analysis, the more positive oriented differences on child discipline are observed in working
mothers. Results suggest that working mothers use less physical ways of discipline and, at the
same time, more pedagogic/neglecting ways, the longer their children have been in the HCB.
Working mothers of children that have been exposed a longer period of time to the program,
decrease the use of physical ways of discipline (factor 1) by 0.07 standard deviations; and
increase the use of pedagogic/neglecting ways (factor 4) by 0.1 standard deviations. In the
case of non-working mothers, they increase the use of neglecting ways of discipline by 0.14
standard deviations. Results suggest that the most positive oriented change in discipline
methods is seen in the sample of working mothers, consistently to what was observed in the
Regression Discontinuity analysis.
Table A.18 shows the differences in some household characteristics for working and non-
working mothers. As in the case for the Regression Discontinuity analysis, mothers and fa-
thers from household where the mother works are more educated (eg. on average have around
1 more year of education, and have less children). Table 15 shows the impact by mothers’
education. Consistently with the results found by whether or not the mother works, the most
positive oriented change in discipline practices is seen in mothers with high education (eg.
8 years of education or more)63. Though both type of mothers use more neglecting ways of
discipline (factor 3); mothers with high education use less physical ways of discipline (factor
1), and more pedagogic oriented ones (factor 4). On the other hand, women with low educa-
tion use more physical and neglecting ways of discipline. More educated women decrease the
use of physical ways of discipline by 0.07 standard deviations, and increase the use of more
oriented pedagogic ways by 0.09 standard deviations. Less educated women increase the use
of physical and neglecting ways of discipline by 0.06 standard deviations.
Besides the factor analysis to approach changes in mothers’ disciplining methods, I also
defined two additional indicators. Based on the listed ways of discipline, I defined two groups:
62In this case, we don’t have information on whether or not the mother works outside the household.
638 years of education corresponds to the median of mothers education.
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physical discipline64, and pedagogic discipline65. For each group, two indicators are built:
“Used most of the time” and “Used any time”. The top panel of Table A.19 shows the results
for situations in which the child doesn’t want to eat, and the bottom panel for situations
in which the child doesn’t want to obey. Results go in line to what was found with the
factor analysis. Mothers whose children have been exposed longer to the program use more
frequently pedagogic ways to discipline their children in both type of situations. On the
other hand, in situations when the child doesn’t want to obey, mothers use less physical
punishment the longer the child has been attending the HCB.
3.3.2 Mechanisms
The change in disciplining practices observed by mothers of children who have been exposed
a longer period of time to the program may come either from a change in mothers’ behavior,
or from both, a change in mothers’ and children’s behavior. Mothers are supposed to attend
bimonthly meetings organized by the Madres Comunitarias in which different topics are ad-
dressed, such as parenting practices. Table 16 shows that mothers whose children have been
attending a HCB 16 months or more, are on average 4 percentage points more likely to have
attended a meeting during the last 6 months. Though mothers in all type of households are
more likely to attend the meetings the longer their children have been in the HCB, the larger
change is observed for working mothers. In this case, mothers of children who have been
exposed longer to the program are 8 percentage points more likely to attend the meetings.
Among working mothers, those whose children have been attending the HCB 2-15m have
a rate of meeting attendance of 54%, while those whose children have been attending the
program more than 15 months, have a rate of attendance of 62%.
During the time children attend a HCB, they are supposed to follow a routine. Children
follow six moments during the day, 1) Welcome, 2) Let’s explore, 3) Let’s create, 4) Let’s
play, 5) Let’s eat and 6) Let’s go home, [ICBF, 2006]. Children learn to follow some rules, for
example, that when it is the “Let’s eat” time they have to sit and finish the meal. This may
help them to also follow better the rules at home. In qualitative interviews with beneficiary
mothers, opinions on this subject were divided. Some mothers expressed that their children
were behaving much better at the meal time since they were attending the HCB. After some
months in the HCB, children finished their meal by themselves, without the mothers needed
to push or force them to eat. However, some other mothers expressed that their children’s
behavior was very different at home, behaving much better at the HCB. We may think then
that the program could be impacting children’s behavior.
64For situations when the child does not want to eat: “take out the plate of food”, “force the child to eat”
and “punish the child physically”. For situations in which the child does not want to obey: “punish the child
physically”, “hit the child with an object”, “hit the child with the hand”, “pinch the child” and “leave the
child without food”.
65For situations in which the child does not want to eat: “play with him to motivate him to eat” and
“explain the importance of eating”. For situations in which the child does not want to obey: “explain the
importance of obeying” and “amuse him with an object”.
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Table 17 shows the results on the impact on children’s behavior by program exposure,
taking into account the three (standardized) factors previously obtained. Overall, children
who have been exposed to the program 16 months or more are less likely to behave bad
at interacting with other children; impact that is larger for children with working mothers.
Children who have been exposed to the program 16 months or more decrease the likelihood of
behaving bad with other children by 0.08 standard deviations, impact that increases to 0.12
standard deviations for children of working mothers. In the analysis by mother’s education,
we find that children from more educated mothers are more likely to behave well the longer
they have been exposed to the program.
Previous evidence suggests that the more positive oriented change in discipline methods
observed in working mothers could be coming from a higher participation in the meetings
organized by the Madre Comunitaria, as well as from a higher decrease in the likelihood that
the child behaves bad at interacting with other children. Though these changes are observed
for most type of households, magnitudes are higher in the sample of working mothers.
4 Conclusions
Being neglected or physically punished as a child can have adverse consequences in adult
life. Yet, not much has been said on how social programs can impact the way parents dis-
cipline children. This paper contributes to the literature by showing that early childhood
interventions affect the way parents discipline kids. I approach the research question through
two different identification strategies. I exploit the fact that a large set of social programs
in Colombia are targeted using a proxy means test instrument, Sisben index, to estimate
impacts of eligibility on a set of early childhood programs using a Regression Discontinuity
Design. To further validate the results, I also estimate the impact of a subsidized child care
program in Colombia, Hogares Comunitarios de Bienestar (HCB), using a Propensity Score
Matching. I use different lengths of exposure to the program as my identification strategy.
To my knowledge, this is one of the first papers to analyze how social programs affect parents’
disciplining methods, in a developing context.
Results from the Regression Discontinuity strategy show that fathers of children who
benefit to a lower extent of the set of programs targeted to early childhood (eg. those above
the threshold), use physical ways of discipline 0.37 standard deviations more, as compared
to fathers of children who largely benefit from these programs. The difference observed in
disciplining methods seems to be driven by a more frequent attendance to health checks
(G&D checks). G&D checks include talks with parents in topics such as parenting, nutri-
tion and health; as well as medical examination done by a doctor or a nurse. At exploring
some heterogeneity by whether or not the mother works outside the household, the change
in father’s behavior is only observed in household with mothers that work outside. Besides,
in this type of households a change in mother’s behavior is also observed. Households with
mothers that work outside have more educated parents, as well as less young children. Con-
sistent with the results found by women’s participation in the labor market; the change in
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parents’ discipline methods is observed in households with more educated women. This first
set of results suggest that interventions are more effective in generating a change on parents’
behavior, the more educated parents are.
Focusing then on the impact of HCB, using a Propensity Score Matching, results suggest
an increase in pedagogic and neglecting ways of discipline the longer the children have been
attending the HCB. However, when I explore heterogeneity by mothers’ labor market par-
ticipation or education, results point that the change towards more positive oriented ways of
discipline is observed in households with working mothers or with more educated mothers.
Among working mothers, mothers of children who have been attending the program a longer
period of time decrease the use of physical ways of discipline by 0.07 standard deviations;
while increase the use of more pedagogic oriented ways by 0.1 standard deviations. The
more positive oriented change in discipline practices observed for working mothers seems to
be explained by a higher attendance to the meetings organized by the Madre Comunitaria,
as well by a higher decrease in the likelihood that children behave bad at interacting with
other children.
For the interpretation of these findings a few important caveats need to be pointed out.
For the Regression Discontinuity analysis, I am working with a re-computed Sisben index
based on the information provided in the DHS05, which can differ from the actual Sisben
index. I rely on the similarity of the Sisben index distributions around the threshold of in-
terest, and on the fact that DHS05 data collection falls just in the middle of data collection
for the Sisben survey. Regarding the Propensity Score Matching estimation, the main draw-
back is the possible bias due to selection on unobservables. Though the balance test after
the matching seems to work well on observable characteristics, it is not possible to know
if it would be the same for unobservable ones. The comparison between those exposed 16
months or more and those exposed 2-15 months deals the best with the possible bias due to
unobservable characteristics, as all children are already part of the program. Finally, I am
working with self-reported data which can raise some concerns. We may think that parents
under report the use of physical punishment because they are aware it corresponds to a bad
behavior, though they do not necessarily stop using it. Even if it would be the case, results
will suggest that social programs are changing the awareness of how bad is to punish children
physically, which is already a first step.
Parenting is not an easy task and social programs can leverage it by given parents the
tools they need to better face all the new situations. Early childhood development interven-
tions addressing mostly nutritional and development outcomes, seem to have an extra benefit
on children disciplining too. The remaining question is then whether or not interventions
addressing parenting and child discipline directly, can intensify the impact already found.
Interventions in Latin America and the Caribbean have started to focus more on parents and
the interaction with their children, by including home visits. One of the first programs to
include home visits was Educa a tu hijo in Cuba and then, similar interventions have been
implemented such as Programa Primeira Infancia Melhor in Brazil, Cuna Más in Peru and
Creciendo con Nuestros Hijos in Ecuador. These programs address mainly parenting skills
such as the importance of playing, reading and singing to the child; still disciplining methods
24
are typically not placed as one of the main objectives. Interventions that include home visits
and community meetings with parents, in which disciplining methods are addressed, could
further enhance the benefits of such programs. By doing such, social programs could fur-
ther contribute to children’s development and the achievement of better outcomes later in life.
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Table 3: Program Discontinuity
All HH
# G&D checks At least 3 G&D
checks
HCB Attendance
β1 -0.717 -0.269* -0.135
(0.645) (0.142) (0.116)
Control Mean (1) 1.431 0.228 0.189
Obs 521 577
HH with mother/father
# G&D checks At least 3 G&D
checks
HCB Attendance
β1 -0.534 -0.235* -0.119
(0.638) (0.139) (0.112)
Control Mean (1) 1.443 0.230 0.191
Obs 506 560
Note: (1) Mean after threshold. Rank [19-25]. Children 0-4 y.o. SE in parenthesis and clustered at sample
unit level. *** p<0.001 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. The difference between the number of observations for G&D
checks and HCB attendance is due to missing values in the responses to G&D attendance.
Table 4: Children Discipline Discontinuity (Factor 1). Mothers and Fathers
All HH HH with mother/father
Father Mother Father Mother
β1 0.374** 0.255 0.393** 0.215
(0.162) (0.224) (0.163) (0.293)
Control Mean(1) 0.068 -0.015 0.069 -0.024
Obs 976 976 942 942
Note: (1) Mean after threshold. Rank [19-25]. Children 0-18 y.o in HH with at least a child 0- 4 y.o. SE in
parenthesis and clustered at sample unit level. *** p<0.001 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1.
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Table 5: Children Discipline Discontinuity (Factor 1). Mothers and Fathers. HH in which both
parents punish the children
Father Mother
β1 0.591*** 0.142
(0.218) (0.395)
Control Mean 0.120 -0.002
Obs 651 651
Note: (1) Mean after threshold. Rank [19-25]. Children 0-18 y.o in HH with at least a child 0- 4 y.o. SE in
parenthesis and clustered at sample unit level. *** p<0.001 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1.
Table 6: Attendance to at least 3 G&D checks, by whether or not the Mother works outside the
HH
Works outside the HH Doesn’t work or works in-
side the HH
β1 -0.351 -0.226*
(0.22) (0.134)
Control Mean (1) 0.323 0.162
Obs 346 548
Note: (1) Mean after threshold. Rank [18-26]. Children 0-18 y.o in HH with at least a child 0- 4 y.o. SE in
parenthesis and clustered at sample unit level. *** p<0.001 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1.
Table 7: Children Discipline Discontinuity (Factor 1). Mothers and Fathers. By whether or not
mothers work outside the household
Mothers work outside the HH Mothers work inside the HH or do not work
Father Mother Father Mother
β1 1.036*** 0.891** -0.001 -0.222
(0.28) (0.424) (0.171) (0.288)
Control Mean (1) 0.220 0.131 -0.031 -0.109
Obs 673 673 1047 1047
Note: (1) Mean after threshold. Rank [18-26]. Children 0-18 y.o in HH with at least one child 0- 4 y.o. SE
in parenthesis and clustered at sample unit level. *** p<0.001 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1.
Table 8: Attendance to at least 3 G&D checks, by whether or not the Mother has education higher
than secondary
High Education Low Education
β1 -0.295 -0.225
(0.197) (0.152)
Control Mean (1) 0.224 0.220
Obs 282 612
Note: (1) Mean after threshold. Rank [18-26]. Children 0-18 y.o in HH with at least a child 0- 4 y.o. SE
in parenthesis and clustered at sample unit level. *** p<0.001 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. High education refers to
education higher than secondary. Low education refers to education secondary or lower.
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Table 9: Children Discipline Discontinuity (Factor 1). Mothers and Fathers. By whether or not
mothers’ education higher than secondary
High Education Low Education
Father Mother Father Mother
β1 0.608** 0.599 0.143 -0.223
(0.256) (0.369) (0.181) (0.368)
Control Mean (1) 0.263 0.171 -0.022 -0.099
Obs 488 488 1232 1232
Note: (1) Mean after threshold. Rank [18-26]. Children 0-18 y.o in HH with at least one child 0- 4 y.o. SE
in parenthesis and clustered at sample unit level. *** p<0.001 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. High education refers to
education higher than secondary. Low education refers to education secondary or lower.
Table 10: Sample Size. HCB Analysis
All HH HH with
partner
Working
mothers
Non-working
mothers
Children 2-5 yo who attend the HCB 2
months or more
10668 6890 5030 4840
For which there is info of controls to
compute the PS
7394 4645 3817 4039
For which there is info on behavior out-
comes
4879 3071 2551 2697
Note: For around 6% of the sample there is no informantion on woman’s labor force participation.
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Table 12: Rotated Factor Loadings on Measures on Child’s Behavior
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
Plays and works in cooperation with other children 0.557 -0.130 0.137
Respects the things that belong to other children 0.646 -0.282 -0.050
Respects other children 0.652 -0.358 -0.026
Accepts the responsability of his actions 0.643 -0.053 -0.095
Follows instructions 0.704 -0.084 -0.032
Works independently 0.602 0.056 -0.030
Follows the rutines at the HCB 0.437 -0.006 0.039
Gets involved in fights with other children -0.092 0.813 0.044
Maltreats or is mean with other children -0.126 0.836 0.104
Hits other children or adults -0.131 0.790 0.145
Cannot be motionless 0.002 0.132 0.810
Gets easily distracted -0.051 0.125 0.637
Is restless -0.049 0.109 0.804
Note: Oblique rotation
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Table 17: Impact on Children’s Behavior. Children who attend the HCB 16m or more as compared
to Children that attend 2-15m
All HH
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
Behavior 0.027 -0.081** -0.040
(0.033) (0.032) (0.034)
Control mean 0.003 0.001 0.004
Obs 4870 4870 4870
HH with mother/father
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
Behavior 0.019 -0.081** -0.054
(0.039) (0.039) (0.04)
Control mean -0.021 0.017 0.002
Obs 3055 3055 3055
HH with working mothers
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
Behavior -0.014 -0.119*** 0.005
(0.047) (0.044) 0.049
Control mean 0.021 0.030 0.0150977
Obs 2529 2529 2529
HH with non-working mothers
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
Behavior 0.076* -0.040 -0.095**
(0.043) (0.043) (0.044)
Control mean -0.020 -0.035 -0.013
Obs 2697 2697 2697
Mothers with educ 8 yrs or more
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
Child Behavior 0.082** -0.014 -0.019
0.042 0.041 0.044
Control mean -0.024 0.030 0.051
Obs 2797 2797 2797
Mothers with educa less than 8 yrs
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
Child Behavior -0.003 -0.129*** -0.091**
0.042 0.04 0.04
Control mean 0.037 -0.036 -0.055
Obs 3197 3197 3197
Note: SE in parenthesis. *** p<0.001 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1.
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Figures
43
Figure 1: Sisben Distribution
Note: Top graph corresponds to data from the Sisben Survey, while the bottom one corresponds to DHS
data
Source: BanRep (Medellin) and DHS05
44
Figure 2: McCray Test
Note: Sample of HH with children 0-18 y.o. Bin Size: 0.5, Bandwidth: 3. Discontinuity estimate:
-0.0118(0.1237) SE in parenthesis
45
Figure 3: Discontinuity on Growth and Development Checks. Children 0-4 y.o.
Note: Bin Size: 0.15. Linear Fit.
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Figure 6: Discontinuity of Children Discipline. Factor Analysis. HH in which the mother works
outside the HH
Note: Rank [18-26]. Linear fit. Children 0-18 y.o. in HH with at least a child 0-4 y.o
49
Figure 7: Discontinuity of Children Discipline. Factor Analysis. HH in which the mother has
education secondary or higher
Note: Rank [18-26]. Linear fit. Children 0-18 y.o. in HH with at least a child 0-4 y.o
50
Figure 8: Distribution of PSM
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A Appendix
Table A.1: Main programs that used Sisben as one of the main targeting criteria
Age Program Sisben level to which is targeted
Sisben 1 Sisben 2
0-6 y.o
Hogares Fami X X
Hogares Comunitarios de Bienestar X X
Hogares Infantiles X X
Jardines Comunitarios X X
Desayunos Infantiles X X
Subsidized health regime (which includes
Growth and Development checks)
X X
Familias en Accion X
Older children and adults
Familias en Accion X
Empleo en Accion X
Programa de Alimentacion para el adulto
mayor (nutritional program for the elderly)
X X
Subsidized Health Regime X X
Housing Subsidy X X
Jovenes en Accion X X
Gratuidad (Reduction in enrollment fees) X X
ACCESS (Acceso con Calidad a la Educacion
Superior)
X
Source: [DNP, 2008]
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Table A.2: Outline Growth and Development Checks
Activity Age Frequency
Registration 0-1m
Medical appointment 0-1m
Monitoring (in charge of a nurse)
0-12m Every 3 months
13-24m Every 4 months
2-4y
25-30m
31-36m
37-48m
49-60m
5-7y
61-66m
67-72m
73-78m
79-84m
8-10y Every year
Source: [MinProteccion]
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Table A.4: Sisben Thresholds. Methodology II
Urban Rural
Sisben 1 [0-11) [0-17.5)
Sisben 2 [11-22) [17.5-32)
Sisben 3 [22-43) [32-51)
Sisben 4 [43-65)
[51-100]Sisben 5 [65-79)
Sisben 6 [79-100]
Source: http://sisben.cali.gov.co/con_sisben/consisben.php
Note: Urban refers to capital municipalities and seat of the municipal government, while rural refers to rural
dispersed areas
Table A.5: Rates in which each measure of child discipline is used by Sisben Level
FATHER MOTHER
Sisben Level Sisben Level
1 2 3 1 2 3
spanking them 0.17 0.19 0.20 0.26 0.28 0.29
pushing them 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02
verbal reprimand 0.77 0.74 0.72 0.77 0.74 0.71
prohibiting something they like 0.39 0.46 0.54 0.51 0.61 0.67
depriving from food 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
hitting with objects 0.52 0.45 0.38 0.61 0.55 0.47
keeping them looked up 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02
ignoring them 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
assigning non-appropiate work 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00
leaving them out of the hh 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
throwing water at them 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
hiding their clothes 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
taking away belongings 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
withdrawing economic support 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
Obs 5681 7823 3509 8877 12668 5832
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Table A.6: Rotated Factor Loadings on Measures of Domestic Violence
Factor 1 Factor 2
has accused you of being unfaithful 0.6961 0.2493
doesn’t allow to meet your friends 0.6528 0.3019
has tried to limit contact with your family 0.4036 0.5804
have used insulting terms 0.1826 0.4501
has threatened you to leave you for other woman 0.1614 0.7673
has threatened you to take your children 0.2983 0.5772
has threatened you to take out economic support 0.4855 0.3705
has threatened you with a knife, fire arm or other weapon 0.6555 0.0441
has pushed you 0.6659 0.0265
has beaten you with the hand 0.6231 0.0915
has beaten you with an object 0.6568 0.0826
has bitten you 0.6286 0.0353
has kicked you or dragged you 0.6246 0.0461
has tried to strangle or burn you 0.6529 0.1324
has forced you to have sex 0.3171 0.7519
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Table A.8: Differences between mothers that work outside the household and those that do not
All HH Work out-
side HH
Doesnt work
or work in-
side the HH
Diff SE Diff Obs
(1) (2) (3) (2)-(3) (2)-(3)
# members 0-6 yo 1.515 1.439 1.566 -0.127** (0.053) 2014
# members 7-14 yo 0.888 0.839 0.922 -0.082 (0.074) 2014
# members 15-24 yo 0.626 0.536 0.686 -0.150** (0.059) 2014
# members 25-64 yo 1.887 1.875 1.896 -0.021 (0.054) 2014
# members 65 or above 0.061 0.066 0.057 0.01 (0.02) 2014
Woman Educ (level) 3.302 3.642 3.070 0.572*** (0.071) 1997
Partner Educ(level) 3.354 3.459 3.281 0.178** (0.072) 1926
Woman Age 31.617 32.237 31.195 1.042** (0.429) 2014
Partner Age 36.010 35.493 36.338 -0.845 (0.587) 1783
Wealth Index 3.536 3.602 3.491 0.111 (0.07) 2014
Note: Analysis in the rank [18-26]. Children 0-18 y.o in HH with at least one child 0- 4 y.o. Standard errors
in parenthesis. For education level, 3 corresponds to secondary and 4 to technical post-secondary.
Table A.9: Placebo Test for Children Discipline
Father Mother
β1 -0.025 0.220
(0.183) (0.241)
Obs 1020 1020
Note: (1) Mean after threshold. Rank [19-25]. Children 5-18 y.o in HH with NO child 0- 4 y.o. SE in
parenthesis and clustered at sample unit level. *** p<0.001 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1.
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Table A.10: Children Discipline Discontinuity (Factor 1). Mothers and Fathers. By Children’s
Age
Children 0-4 y.o.
Father Mother
β1 0.367** 0.287
(0.174) (0.272)
Control Mean (1) 0.094 -0.019
Obs 570 570
Children 5-18 y.o.
Father Mother
β1 0.390* -0.232
(0.231) (0.519)
Control Mean (1) 0.028 0.008
Obs 406 406
Note: (1) Mean after threshold. Rank [19-25]. HH with at least a child 0-4 y.o. SE in parenthesis and
clustered at sample unit level. *** p<0.001 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1.
Table A.11: Impact on Domestic Violence
Factor 1 Factor 2
β1 -0.179 0.6
(0.3) (0.515)
Control Mean(1) -0.328 -0.078
Obs 942
Note: (1) Mean after threshold. Rank [19-25]. Sample of women with partner and with at least a child 0- 4
y.o. SE in parenthesis and clustered at sample unit level. *** p<0.001 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1.
Table A.12: Other Family Outcomes
Women Em-
powerment
Children liv-
ing at home
Children
outside
home
It has been
in more than
1 union
Age at 1st
marriage
β1 0.127 0.176 0.101 -0.099 -0.147
(0.311) (0.145) (0.097) (0.09) (0.935)
Control Mean(1) 0.150 2.414 0.180 0.099 21.135
Obs 1474 1743 1743 1743 1743
Note: (1) Mean after threshold. Rank [19-25]. Sample of women with at least a child 0- 4 y.o. SE in
parenthesis and clustered at sample unit level. *** p<0.001 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1.
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Table A.13: Impact on Anthropometric Outcomes. Children 0-4 y.o
All
Weight/Age Height/Age Weight/Height
β1 0.086 -0.024 -0.269
(0.315) (0.346) (0.377)
Control Mean(1) -0.334 -0.283 -0.191
Obs 662 363 469
Boys
Weight/Age Height/Age Weight/Height
β1 0.261 0.221 -0.516
(0.417) (0.552) (0.521)
Control Mean(1) -0.315 -0.250 -0.136
Obs 330 182 242
Girls
Weight/Age Height/Age Weight/Height
β1 0.05 -0.018 0.135
(0.447) (0.534) (0.632)
Control Mean(1) -0.286 -0.296 -0.236
Obs 332 181 227
Note: Estimations on the rank [18-26]. Controlling for hh composition, woman and partner’s age and
education, wealth index and child’s weight and length at birth. W/A: weight for age. H/A: height for age.
W/H: weight for height. (1) Mean after the threshold. SE in parenthesis. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1
For the following table, Table A.14, estimations are done on the indicators “Number of
yes” and “Any Yes”, defined by Equation 5 and Equation 6
Num_Y es =
∑J
j=1Qi ∀ j = 1, ..., J (5)
Any_Y es = 1 if Qj = 1 ∀ j = 1, ..., J0 otherwise (6)
Equation 5 corresponds to Number of Yes defined in the rank [0-J] and Equation 6 to Any
Yes defined in the rank [0-1]. J=8 for physical punishment. Qj corresponds to the question
that asks whether or not father or mother use way i to punish children, which is coded 1 for
yes and 0 for no.
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Table A.14: Impact on Child Discipline. Other indicators.
All HH
Father Mother
Number of
Yes
Any Yes Number of
Yes
Any Yes
β1 0.422** 0.208 0.314 0.188
(0.196) (0.137) (0.194) (0.124)
Control Mean(1) 0.594 0.512 0.843 0.708
Obs 1720 1720 1720 1720
HH with mother and father
Father Mother
Number of
Yes
Any Yes Number of
Yes
Any Yes
β1 0.416** 0.202 0.382** 0.220*
(0.198) (0.139) (0.193) (0.126)
Control Mean(1) 0.514 0.462 0.830 0.700
Obs 1666 1666 1666 1666
Note: Estimations on the rank [19-25]. Controlling for hh composition, woman and partner’s age and edu-
cation, wealth index and child’s weight and length at birth. (1) Mean after the threshold. SE in parenthesis.
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1
Table A.15: HH characteristics. Children who have attended the HCB 16 months or more vs
Children who have attended 2-15 months
16m or
more
2-15m Diff(16m-2-
15m)
SE Obs
Child age (months) 48.67 39.85 8.814*** 0.21 10660
Child gender (1=boy) 0.51 0.52 -0.006 0.01 10668
Mother works 0.53 0.49 0.045*** 0.011 9870
Mother education 7.55 7.82 -0.272*** 0.08 9868
Mother age 28.88 27.82 1.060*** 0.136 9872
# hh members 5.03 4.97 0.057 0.042 10668
# children at home 2.77 2.50 0.272*** 0.035 10668
HCB in the neighborhood 0.96 0.93 0.026*** 0.005 10668
Has attended another care center 0.04 0.03 0.018*** 0.004 10666
Main care giver=mother 0.86 0.86 0.001 0.007 10668
Main reason to choose care option=quality 0.70 0.67 0.027*** 0.01 10668
Had difficulties to find a care center 0.10 0.13 -0.032*** 0.007 10668
Urban area 0.87 0.91 -0.041*** 0.008 10668
Exposure to the program (months) 26.79 8.10 18.681*** 0.18 10668
Attendance to G&D checks 0.65 0.67 -0.023** 0.011 10668
Mother in union 0.68 0.71 -0.033*** 0.01 9868
Note: SE in parenthesis. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1
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Table A.16: HH characteristics. Children who have attended the HCB 16 months or more vs
Children who have attended 2-15 months. HH where the father is present.
16m or
more
2-15m Diff(16m-2-
15m)
SE Obs
Child age (months) 48.76 39.87 8.893*** 0.247 6887
Child gender (1=boy) 0.51 0.52 -0.015 0.012 6890
Mother works 0.46 0.41 0.046*** 0.013 6889
Father works 0.94 0.93 0.008 0.007 6072
Mother education 7.54 7.83 -0.290*** 0.097 6880
Father education 7.02 7.37 -0.344*** 0.101 6021
Mother age 28.98 28.07 0.914*** 0.16 6890
Father age 33.40 32.45 0.953*** 0.208 6074
# hh members 4.98 4.82 0.161*** 0.045 6890
# children at home 2.83 2.55 0.277*** 0.041 6890
HCB in the neighborhood 0.95 0.93 0.020*** 0.006 6890
Has attended another care center 0.05 0.03 0.023*** 0.006 6890
Main care giver=mother 0.95 0.95 0.003 0.005 6890
Main reason to choose care option=quality 0.71 0.68 0.028** 0.012 6890
Had difficulties to find a care center 0.10 0.13 -0.035*** 0.008 6890
Urban area 0.86 0.90 -0.042*** 0.01 6890
Exposure to the program (months) 26.40 8.10 18.295*** 0.218 6890
Attendance to G&D checks 0.66 0.69 -0.033** 0.013 6890
Note: SE in parenthesis. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1
62
Ta
bl
e
A
.1
7:
Ba
la
nc
e
Te
st
af
te
r
PS
M
by
st
ra
ta
.
A
ll
ty
pe
of
ho
us
eh
ol
ds
B
lo
ck
1
B
lo
ck
2
B
lo
ck
3
B
lo
ck
4
B
lo
ck
5
D
iff
(1
6m
vs
2-
15
m
)
SE
D
iff
(1
6m
vs
2-
15
m
)
SE
D
iff
(1
6m
vs
2-
15
m
)
SE
D
iff
(1
6m
vs
2-
15
m
)
SE
D
iff
(1
6m
vs
2-
15
m
)
SE
C
hi
ld
ag
e
(m
on
th
s)
-0
.3
95
(0
.3
05
)
0.
29
9
(0
.2
8)
0.
17
(0
.2
47
)
-0
.0
36
(0
.2
65
)
0.
16
7
(0
.3
32
)
C
hi
ld
ge
nd
er
(1
=
bo
y)
-0
.0
1
(0
.0
47
)
-0
.0
36
(0
.0
31
)
0.
02
4
(0
.0
26
)
0.
00
3
(0
.0
26
)
-0
.0
01
(0
.0
29
)
M
ot
he
r
w
or
ks
-0
.0
08
(0
.0
47
)
0.
04
8
(0
.0
32
)
-0
.0
09
(0
.0
27
)
-0
.0
55
**
(0
.0
25
)
0.
04
6
(0
.0
29
)
M
ot
he
r
ed
uc
at
io
n
0.
29
7
(0
.2
99
)
0.
16
(0
.2
19
)
-0
.1
11
(0
.1
73
)
-0
.2
76
(0
.1
78
)
0.
35
2*
(0
.2
03
)
M
ot
he
r
ag
e
0.
34
8
(0
.5
48
)
0.
00
8
(0
.3
57
)
-0
.2
11
(0
.3
43
)
0.
01
3
(0
.3
53
)
0.
21
7
(0
.3
49
)
#
hh
m
em
be
rs
-0
.1
71
(0
.1
57
)
0.
01
(0
.1
16
)
-0
.0
25
(0
.0
92
)
0.
05
7
(0
.0
85
)
-0
.0
29
(0
.1
12
)
#
ch
ild
re
n
at
ho
m
e
-0
.0
13
(0
.1
08
)
0.
06
2
(0
.0
82
)
-0
.0
41
(0
.0
73
)
0.
06
5
(0
.0
76
)
-0
.1
22
(0
.0
98
)
H
C
B
in
th
e
ne
ig
hb
or
ho
od
0.
00
9
(0
.0
28
)
-0
.0
07
(0
.0
17
)
-0
.0
02
(0
.0
13
)
0.
01
1
(0
.0
09
)
0
(0
.0
08
)
H
as
at
te
nd
ed
an
ot
he
r
ca
re
ce
nt
er
-0
.0
01
(0
.0
14
)
-0
.0
1
(0
.0
08
)
0.
01
3
(0
.0
09
)
-0
.0
13
(0
.0
09
)
0.
01
(0
.0
16
)
M
ai
n
ca
re
gi
ve
r=
m
ot
he
r
-0
.0
33
(0
.0
26
)
-0
.0
13
(0
.0
15
)
0.
01
3
(0
.0
14
)
0.
00
3
(0
.0
12
)
0.
00
8
(0
.0
15
)
M
ai
n
re
as
on
to
ch
oo
se
ca
re
op
tio
n=
qu
al
ity
-0
.0
13
(0
.0
47
)
-0
.0
50
*
(0
.0
3)
0.
01
9
(0
.0
25
)
0.
02
4
(0
.0
23
)
-0
.0
14
(0
.0
25
)
H
ad
di
ffi
cu
lti
es
to
fin
d
a
ca
re
ce
nt
er
-0
.0
26
(0
.0
32
)
0.
00
9
(0
.0
22
)
-0
.0
07
(0
.0
19
)
0.
00
3
(0
.0
14
)
0.
00
2
(0
.0
16
)
U
rb
an
ar
ea
0.
00
7
(0
.0
25
)
-0
.0
21
(0
.0
17
)
0.
02
3
(0
.0
15
)
-0
.0
12
(0
.0
14
)
-0
.0
05
(0
.0
24
)
A
tt
en
da
nc
e
to
G
&
D
ch
ec
ks
-0
.0
13
(0
.0
45
)
0.
02
8
(0
.0
27
)
-0
.0
15
(0
.0
25
)
0.
00
4
(0
.0
24
)
0.
02
6
(0
.0
29
)
M
ot
he
r
in
un
io
n
-0
.0
2
(0
.0
41
)
0.
01
2
(0
.0
29
)
0.
00
4
(0
.0
23
)
0.
01
8
(0
.0
23
)
-0
.0
24
(0
.0
28
)
O
bs
11
47
14
85
15
46
16
22
15
79
N
ot
e:
SE
in
pa
re
nt
he
sis
.
**
*
p<
0.
00
1
**
p<
0.
05
*
p<
0.
1.
63
Table A.18: Differences between working and non-working mothers
Working
Mothers
Non-
Working
Mothers
Diff (1)-(2) SE (1)-(2) Obs
Child age (months) 43.92 43.48 0.437** (0.219) 9864
Child gender (1=boy) 0.51 0.51 0 (0.01) 9870
Father works 0.94 0.93 0.007 (0.007) 6082
Mother education (Yrs) 8.15 7.25 0.902*** (0.085) 9856
Father education (Yrs) 7.58 6.94 0.643*** (0.106) 6031
Mother age 29.00 27.55 1.448*** (0.143) 9870
Father age 33.04 32.72 0.319 (0.228) 6084
# hh members 4.76 5.17 -0.415*** (0.045) 9870
# children at home 2.49 2.74 -0.241*** (0.04) 9870
Urban area 0.93 0.86 0.064*** (0.01) 9870
Attendance to G&D checks 0.66 0.67 -0.004 (0.012) 9870
Mother in union 0.59 0.81 -0.213*** (0.01) 9866
Note: Sample of children 2-5 y.o. who have been attending the HCB more than 2 months. *** p<0.001 **
p<0.05 * p<0.1.
For the following table, Table A.19, estimations are done on the indicators “Used most
of the time” and “Used any time”, defined by Equation 7 and Equation 8
Used_most_of_the_time = 1 if Qj >= 3 ∀ j = 1, ..., J0 otherwise (7)
Used_Any_time = 1 if Qj >= 2 ∀ i = 1, ..., J0 otherwise (8)
Both indicators are in the rank [0-1]. J=2(eat)/4(obey) for physical discipline and
J=3(eat)/5(obey) for pedagogic discipline. Qj corresponds to the question that asks if the
mother punishes the child using way i, which is coded 1 for never, 2 for sometimes, 3 for
almost every time and 4 for always.
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B Suplementary Appendix
Estimations on the threshold from Sisben 1 to 2
Similarly to what was done to estimate discontinuities on the threshold from Sisben 2 to 3,
I estimate Equation 9 to check for discontinuities in G&D checks and HCB attendance, as
well as in physical punishment on the threshold from Sisben 1 to Sisben 2.
yi = α0 + β11 {Si ≥ 11} + β2f2(S˜i) + β3f2(S˜i) ∗ 1 {Si ≥ 11} + β4Ci + µi (9)
Where yi is the outcome of interest at the individual or household level, Si is the Sisben
index, S˜i = Si − 11 is the normalized score, 1 {Si ≥ 11} identifies those who are after the
threshold and f2(S˜i) corresponds to a quadratic polynomial on the normalized score, which I
allow to be different after the threshold with the interaction f2(S˜i)∗1 {Si ≥ 11}. C represents
a the set of household controls. Impact of the program is given by β1, which represents the
change in y at the eligibility threshold, in this case 11. All estimations are in the rank [8-14].
Test for optimal bandwidth proposed by [Imbens and Kalyanaraman, 2010] suggested, on
average, an optimal bandwidth of 2.2.
Table B.1: Program’s Discontinuity
# G&D
checks
At least 3
G&D checks
β1 0.02 -0.027
(0.273) (0.061)
Control Mean (1) 1.132 0.178
Obs 1784
Note: Estimations on the rank [8-14]. Controlling for hh composition, woman and partner’s age and educa-
tion, wealth index and child’s weight and length at birth. (1) Mean after the threshold. SE in parenthesis.
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1
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Linear Polynomial Specification and Regressions in the
rank [19-25]
For the linear polynomial specification I estimate Equation 10.
yi = α0 + γ11 {Si ≥ 22} + γ2f1(S˜i) + γ3f1(S˜i) ∗ 1 {Si ≥ 22} + γ6Ci + µi (10)
For the quadratic polynomial specification I estimate Equation 11.
yi = α0 + β11 {Si ≥ 22} + β2f2(S˜i) + β3f2(S˜i) ∗ 1 {Si ≥ 22} + β4Ci + µi (11)
Where yi is the outcome of interest at the individual or household level, Si is the Sisben
index, S˜i = Si − 22 is the normalized score, 1 {Si ≥ 22} identifies those who are after the
threshold, f1(S˜i) corresponds to a linear polynomial in the normalized score and f2(S˜i) to a
quadratic one. C represents a the set of household controls. Impact of the program is given
by β1 for the quadratic polynomial, and by γ1, for the linear one.
Table B.2: Program’s Discontinuity
Rank [19-25]
# G&D checks At least 3 G&D
checks
HCB Attendance
γ1 -0.873** -0.271*** -0.001
(0.409) (0.096) (0.076)
Obs 521 577
Rank [18-26]
# G&D checks At least 3 G&D
checks
HCB Attendance
γ1 -0.644** -0.239*** 0.006
(0.327) (0.079) (0.066)
β1 -0.806 -0.274** -0.068
(0.516) (0.119) (0.1)
Obs 894 987
Note: Controlling for hh composition, woman and partner’s age and education, wealth index and child’s
weight and length at birth. (1) Mean after the threshold. SE in parenthesis. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1
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Table B.3: Children Discipline Discontinuity (Factor 1). Mothers and Fathers.
Rank [19-25]
Father Mother
γ1 0.318** 0.152
(0.126) (0.181)
Obs 976 976
Rank [18-26]
Father Mother
γ1 0.198* 0.024
(0.115) (0.143)
β1 0.365** 0.151
(0.149) (0.236)
Obs 1720 1720
Note: Controlling for hh composition, woman and partner’s age and education, wealth index and child’s
weight and length at birth. (1) Mean after the threshold. SE in parenthesis. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1
Table B.4: Children Discipline Discontinuity (Factor 1). Mothers and Fathers. Only HH in which
Mothers work outside
Rank [19-25]
Father Mother
γ1 0.763*** 0.600*
(0.227) (0.313)
Obs 410 410
Rank [18-26]
Father Mother
γ1 0.545*** 0.336
(0.206) (0.243)
β1 1.036*** 0.891**
(0.28) (0.424)
Obs 673 673
Note: Controlling for hh composition, woman and partner’s age and education, wealth index and child’s
weight and length at birth. (1) Mean after the threshold. SE in parenthesis. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1
68
Table B.5: Children Discipline Discontinuity (Factor 1). Mothers and Fathers. Only HH in which
Mothers have education higher than secondary
Rank [19-25]
Father Mother
γ1 0.588*** 0.458*
(0.202) (0.263)
Obs 362 362
Rank [18-26]
Father Mother
γ1 0.410** 0.247
(0.196) (0.215)
β1 0.608** 0.599
(0.256) (0.369)
Obs 488 488
Note: Controlling for hh composition, woman and partner’s age and education, wealth index and child’s
weight and length at birth. (1) Mean after the threshold. SE in parenthesis. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1
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Instrumental Variable Specification
In the first stage, programs’ attendance is estimated by Equation 11, where yi represents
either whether or not the child has attended 3 G&D checks over the year. The second stage
is given by Equation 12.
disciplinei = α0 + δ1yˆi + δ2Ci + µi (12)
Where disciplinei represents how child i is punished. yˆi is the estimated change in pro-
gram attendance after estimating Equation 11. As before, C represents a the set of household
controls. Impact of the program is given by δ1, which represents the change in disciplinei
when the child is more likely to attend at least 3 G&D checks over the year.
Table B.6: Children Discipline Discontinuity (Factor 1). Mothers and Fathers. IV estimation.
Children 0-4 y.o.
RANK [18-26] RANK [19-25]
Father Mother Father Mother
δ1 -0.672 -0.275 -0.793 -0.341
(0.499) (0.607) (0.525) (0.56)
Control Mean(1) 0.058 0.083 0.054 0.078
Obs 880 880 515 515
Note: Controls include hh composition, woman and partner’s age and education, and wealth. (1) Mean for
those who do not attend at least 3 G&D checks over the year within the rank [19-25]. SE in parenthesis and
clustered at sample unit level. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1
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Other Figures and Tables of PSM Estimation
Table B.7: HH characteristics. Children who have attended the HCB 16 months or more vs
Children who have attended 2-15 months. Working-mother HH
16m or
more
2-15m Diff(16m-2-
15m)
SE Obs
Child age (months) 48.49 39.92 8.571*** 0.292 5027
Child gender (1=boy) 0.51 0.51 -0.006 0.014 5030
Mother education 8.03 8.25 -0.219** 0.1 5022
Mother age 29.64 28.44 1.207*** 0.192 5030
# hh members 4.76 4.75 0.015 0.057 5030
# children at home 2.63 2.38 0.250*** 0.047 5030
HCB in the neighborhood 0.96 0.93 0.030*** 0.007 5030
Has attended another care center 0.04 0.03 0.010* 0.006 5030
Main care giver=mother 0.87 0.86 0.009 0.01 5030
Main reason to choose care option=quality 0.71 0.67 0.043*** 0.014 5030
Had difficulties to find a care center 0.12 0.16 -0.043*** 0.01 5030
Urban area 0.91 0.94 -0.031*** 0.009 5030
Attendance to G&D checks 0.66 0.66 -0.001 0.014 5030
Mother in union 0.58 0.60 -0.017 0.014 5027
Note: SE in parenthesis. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1
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Table B.8: HH characteristics. Children who have attended the HCB 16 months or more vs
Children who have attended 2-15 months. Non-Working-mother HH
16m or
more
2-15m Diff(16m-2-
15m)
SE Obs
Child age (months) 48.79 39.60 9.197*** 0.297 4837
Child gender (1=boy) 0.51 0.52 -0.01 0.014 4840
Mother education 7.00 7.43 -0.426*** 0.118 4834
Mother age 28.00 27.22 0.782*** 0.198 4840
# hh members 5.29 5.09 0.202*** 0.059 4840
# children at home 2.92 2.60 0.322*** 0.052 4840
HCB in the neighborhood 0.95 0.93 0.018** 0.008 4840
Has attended another care center 0.05 0.03 0.026*** 0.007 4840
Main care giver=mother 0.98 0.97 0.004 0.004 4840
Main reason to choose care option=quality 0.69 0.68 0.013 0.015 4840
Had difficulties to find a care center 0.09 0.11 -0.028*** 0.009 4840
Urban area 0.83 0.89 -0.059*** 0.013 4840
Attendance to G&D checks 0.64 0.68 -0.041*** 0.015 4840
Mother in union 0.79 0.82 -0.030** 0.012 4839
Note: SE in parenthesis. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1
Table B.9: HH characteristics. Children who have attended the HCB 16 months or more vs
Children who have attended 2-15 months. Mothers with at least 8 yrs of education
16m or
more
2-15m Diff(16m-2-
15m)
SE Obs
Child age (months) 48.12 39.01 9.110*** 0.272 6012
Child gender (1=boy) 0.51 0.52 -0.011 0.013 6016
Mother works 0.58 0.53 0.051*** 0.014 5228
Mother education 10.59 10.60 -0.005 0.05 5216
Mother age 27.85 26.97 0.884*** 0.168 5230
# hh members 4.71 4.80 -0.091* 0.049 6016
# children at home 2.24 2.11 0.124*** 0.036 6016
HCB in the neighborhood 0.96 0.94 0.018*** 0.006 6016
Has attended another care center 0.05 0.03 0.016*** 0.006 6014
Main care giver=mother 0.80 0.81 -0.01 0.01 6016
Main reason to choose care option=quality 0.69 0.68 0.012 0.012 6016
Had difficulties to find a care center 0.10 0.14 -0.032*** 0.009 6016
Urban area 0.90 0.93 -0.029*** 0.009 6016
Attendance to G&D checks 0.67 0.70 -0.029** 0.013 6016
Mother in union 0.67 0.71 -0.035*** 0.013 5228
Note: SE in parenthesis. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1
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Table B.10: HH characteristics. Children who have attended the HCB 16 months or more vs
Children who have attended 2-15 months. Mothers with less than 8 yrs of education
16m or
more
2-15m Diff(16m-2-
15m)
SE Obs
Child age (months) 49.33 40.99 8.339*** 0.3 4648
Child gender (1=boy) 0.51 0.51 0.001 0.015 4652
Mother works 0.48 0.44 0.045*** 0.016 4642
Mother education 4.36 4.54 -0.174*** 0.062 4652
Mother age 29.95 28.82 1.130*** 0.224 4642
# hh members 5.42 5.20 0.215*** 0.065 4652
# children at home 3.43 3.03 0.400*** 0.058 4652
HCB in the neighborhood 0.95 0.92 0.036*** 0.007 4652
Has attended another care center 0.04 0.02 0.020*** 0.006 4652
Main care giver=mother 0.94 0.93 0.008 0.007 4652
Main reason to choose care option=quality 0.72 0.67 0.046*** 0.015 4652
Had difficulties to find a care center 0.09 0.13 -0.032*** 0.009 4652
Urban area 0.84 0.89 -0.054*** 0.012 4652
Attendance to G&D checks 0.62 0.63 -0.011 0.016 4652
Mother in union 0.69 0.72 -0.031** 0.015 4640
Note: SE in parenthesis. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1
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Figure 9: Distribution of PSM. HH with father present.
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